Institute of Politics and Governance

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
(continued)

2) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY ENACROACHED ON THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY PLACING TEN BILLION PESOS (P10 BILLION) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS DUE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES?

3) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER “UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS” CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE RESPONDENTS?

4) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER “UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS” CONSTITUTES AN AMENDMENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, WHICH CANNOT BE DONE IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT AND WHICH PURPOSE WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THE TITLE OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA?

5) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE REDUCTION AND WITHHOLDING OF THE IRA UNDERMINES THE FOUNDATION OF OUR LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM MANDATED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION?

The petitioners respectfully submit that, in passing and approving, respectively, the year 2000 GAA with the unconstitutional provisions quoted above, the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated the clear provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991, as well as numerous relevant Supreme Court decisions. The respondents’ implementation of such void and unconstitutional legislation is a continuing commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and a clear transgression of the Constitution and existing laws. Such unlawful implementation of the unconstitutional law must, perforce, be stopped and the respondents must be directed to strictly comply with the mandates of the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

DISCUSSION

35. Before the discussion of the constitutional issues, it is important to establish the petitioners’ legal personality to impugn the validity of the year 2000 GAA on constitutional grounds. In fact, the issue of the petitioners’ standing to file this case is as important as, and integral to, the constitutional issues raised. Thus, the Petition shall first deal with this issue.

The petitioners have the legal standing
as they have personal and substantial
interests in this case.

36. The settled rule is that the party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the said party has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 1937) It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which the said party is lawfully entitled or that the said party is in danger of being subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. These requirements, the petitioners humbly submit, are adequately met in this Petition. The petitioners have a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy. The placing of P10 Billion of the IRA under “unprogrammed funds” violates the petitioners’ rights to the following:

(1) efficient delivery of basic services;

(2) autonomous local governments that are primarily accountable to the people;

(3) democratic participation in local governance.

The IRA cut adversely affects
the delivery of basic services.

37. Following the constitutional mandate (Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution) for the enactment of a Local Government Code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 2 of the Local Government Code explains the policy of decentralization as a system whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.

38. As a strategy of decentralization, the law adopts the policy of devolution. As defined by the Local Government Code, “devolution” refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (Section 17 [e]) The law mandates the devolution of certain basic services and facilities from the national government to the local government units. The law also authorizes local governments to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated in the Local Government Code. (Section 17 [b])[1] With the devolution of the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities from the national government to the local government units, local governments became primarily responsible for the delivery of basic services to the people.

39. To enable the local government units to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions, the Local Government Code grants the local government units the necessary resources for these added responsibilities. Declaring this as one of the operative principles of local autonomy and decentralization, the law provides:

Sec. 3 (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in the national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas;

More specifically, the Local Government Code declares that the basic services and facilities the provision of which were devolved to local government units shall be funded from the share of the local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government. (Section 17 [g])

40. As discussed above, the provisions of the Local Government Code clearly show the direct link between the devolved powers and responsibilities (especially with respect to the provision of basic services and facilities), and the local governments’ share in the proceeds of national taxes. The grant of the local government units’ just share in the proceeds of national taxes is an essential part of devolution, which is, in turn, an essential part of decentralization.

41. The P10 Billion cut in the IRA, the local governments’ just share in the proceeds of national taxes, has adversely affected and continues to have a deleterious effect on the local governments’ delivery of basic services and facilities to the people. Most local government units (particularly 5th and 6th class municipalities) rely heavily on the IRA for their operations. The reduction in the amount of the IRA received by the local governments ultimately affected and continues to affect the people, among which are the petitioners in this case and the other citizens that they represent. Simply put, fewer funds for local governments means less efficient delivery of basic services to the people.

42. The petitioners, and the other citizens and taxpayers, clearly have the right to the delivery of basic services and facilities by the local governments. With the reduction of the funds available for the discharge of the local governments’ primary responsibility to the people, the people will ultimately suffer and be deprived of the basic services that they are entitled to get.

43. As Punong Barangays, petitioners ISABEL MENDEZ (of Barangay Atabay, Alcoy, Cebu) and CAROLINA ROMANOS (of Barangay Daang Lungsod, Alcoy, Cebu) are directly injured by the unconstitutional acts assailed in this Petition. As duly elected local government officials and leaders of their respective communities, the funds available to them for the discharge of their powers, functions, and responsibilities, have been unlawfully reduced by the National Government. As a member of the Barangay Development Council of Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, petitioner ADELINO LAVADOR likewise suffers from the unconstitutional reduction and withholding of the IRA. The Barangay Development Council will now have to contend with the reduced amount of the development funds that are available for the implementation of the Barangay Development Council’s plans and programs.

The IRA cut violates the people’s
right to have local governments
that enjoy autonomy.

44. More serious than its deleterious effect on the system of decentralization and devolution, and the delivery of basic services to the people, however, the unlawful IRA reduction and withholding shakes the foundations of local autonomy, which is at the heart of our local governance system.

45. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution (the Declaration of Principles) clearly provides that, “The state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.” A similar statement is contained in Section 2, Article X, “The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.” For its part, the Local Government Code provides that local governments shall enjoy “genuine and meaningful local autonomy” to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. (Section 2.)

46. While autonomy of local governments does not mean absolute independence from the central or national government, it is incompatible with the concept of subservient dependence. In fact, the Code calls the local governments “partners” in national development. Simply put, local governments should have enough elbow room to effectively discharge their powers and responsibilities free from the dictates and control of the national government authorities, subject only to the prescribed limitations of their powers and their accountability to their constituents.

47. It is in this regard that the IRA problem strikes at the very heart of autonomy, and consequently, of effective local governance. The IRA reduction puts local governments at the mercy of the national government authorities in the Executive and Legislative branches. At the constant threat of losing a big chunk of their budget, local governments are susceptible to succumb to the whims and caprices of national government officials, at the expense of the people. Local government officials will be tempted to offer something to national government officials in exchange for the IRA. If not corrected, the bad precedent that was started on this year’s budget will perpetuate a system of dependence where local governments always look up to the national government for help. This is clearly anathema to the “self-reliant communities” envisioned in the law.

48. Worse, this culture of dependence has an even uglier side. Local governments’ dependence on the national government will inevitably lead to their subservience. They will no longer be free to chart their own destiny and shape their own future. They will forever be towed, and willingly, by the national government. The IRA cut cultivates a system where local government officials who are held hostage by the budget process will be primarily accountable, not to the sovereign people that gave them the power of governance, but to the national leaders that control the nation’s purse.

The IRA cut violates the people’s
right to democratic participation
in local governance.

49. When the Constitution mandates the setting up of a responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization, the Constitution goes farther and provides that such local governance structure shall have effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. (Art. X, Sec. 3) The Constitution also provides that the legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law. (Art. X, Sec. 9) The Constitution’s chapter on Social Justice and Human Rights devotes a portion on the role and rights of people’s organizations and guarantees the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making. (Art. XIII, Sec. 15-16) Consistent with the Constitutional policy of democratizing local governance, the Local Government Code provides for the mechanisms that will ensure the people’s participation in local governance.[2]

50. These Constitutional and statutory provisions emphasize that the democratic mechanisms that will ensure the people’s participation in governance shall remain inseparable from local autonomy and governance. Local autonomy, in fact, is meant to shield local governments from unwarranted influence and control of national government authorities so that these local governments can effectively discharge their powers and responsibilities with only the people’s interest in mind.

51. The IRA is meant not only for the cost of devolution but also for the cost of democratization of governance at the local level. Hence, the IRA reduction will certainly mean a reduction in the funds that can finance the mechanisms for people’s participation in local governance. It provides local government officials an excuse to dispense with the implementation of the democratic mechanisms and venues for people’s participation in governance. The failure to convene the local special bodies, for example, can be blamed on the lack of funds. Doubtless, the IRA cut can also be a ready argument against the implementation of the constitutional mandate for sectoral representation in the local legislative bodies.

52. More than the breakdown in the democratic structures for people’s participation in local governance, however, the IRA problem poses a more dangerous, albeit not readily apparent, threat. Using the IRA as an effective carrot - a magic charm - the national government has successfully turned the local governments’ loyalty and attention away from their constituents. Local governments are, once more, in danger of being mere instruments of the national government, to the prejudice of the people to whom they should be accountable. Adding insult to injury, all these are made through the use of the people’s funds that should have been automatically released to them through the local governments.