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ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (ACORD); BALAY MINDANAW FOUNDATION, INC. (BMFI); BARRIOS, INC.; CAMARINES SUR NGO-PO DEVELOPMENT NETWORK, INC. (CADENET); CENTER FOR PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (CPAG); ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, INC. (ELAC); FELLOWSHIP FOR ORGANIZING ENDEAVORS (FORGE); FOUNDATION FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, INC. (FLAGG); INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE (IPG); KAISAHAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN); MANGGAGAWANG KABABAIHANG MITHI AY PAGLAYA (MAKALAYA); NAGA CITY PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (NCPC); NGO-PO COUNCIL OF CAMARINES SUR FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT, INC. (NPCCS); PAILIG DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (PDFI); PHILIPPINE ECUMENICAL ACTION FOR COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (PEACE FOUNDATION, INC.); PHILIPPINE PARTNERSHIP FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN RURAL AREAS (PHILDHRRA); PILIPINA, INC. (ANG KILUSAN NG KABABAIHANG PILIPINO); SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN); URBAN LAND REFORM TASK FORCE (ULR-TF); ADELINO C. LAVADOR; PUNONG BARANGAY ISABEL MENDEZ; PUNONG BARANGAY CAROLINA ROMANOS,
Petitioners

- Versus-HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. BENJAMIN DIOKNO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. LEONOR MAGTOLIS-BRIONES, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. ____________For Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order.
Respondents.
X-------------------------------------X

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order

PETITIONERS, by counsel, respectfully state:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case involves TEN BILLION PESOS of public funds. But this case is not simply about money; it is about governance. It is about the right of the people to good governance, to accountability of public officials, and to the public officials' fulfillment of their sworn duty to preserve and protect the governmental structures and processes enshrined in the Constitution.

Involved in this case is the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for local governments in the year 2000 General Appropriations Act. This issue occupied newspaper headlines in the last weeks of the year 1999 and the early weeks of the year 2000, delayed the passage of the national budget, and almost caused a four-day paralyzation of the operations of local governments.

While this Petition was being prepared, this Honorable Court issued on 19 July 2000 its decision in the case entitled, "Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., petitioner; Roberto Pagdanganan, intervenor v. Hon. Alexander Aguirre and Hon. Emilia Boncodin, respondents" G.R. No. 132988. In the said decision, this Honorable Court declared that the President's unilateral withholding of 10% (later 5%) of the IRA effectively encroached on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. The Honorable Court's decision is laudable. The resolution, however, merely focused on the Executive's encroachment on local autonomy, as it was the issue presented before the Court. The present petition seeks a declaration that a similar withholding of the IRA by the Legislative is likewise an encroachment on the autonomy of local governments that must be struck down for being unconstitutional.

While the national and local government officials fight the battle over the IRA in the halls of power, it is the people's interest that is at risk. The arena for the conflict between the national and local government officials may be ominously quiet at this point. But the IRA issue remains unresolved. Due to the grave importance of this issue to the nation, the people cannot afford to be silent.

This Petition presents the people's side on the IRA debate.

NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PETITION

This is a Petition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. The Petition prays that this Honorable Court issue:

1) A judgment declaring null and void, for being unconstitutional, Section 1, XXXVII (A) and LIV, Special Provisions 1 and 4, of Republic Act No. 8760 entitled, "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," insofar as it reduced the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local governments by TEN BILLION PESOS (P10B) by placing such amount under the item, "unprogrammed funds," thereby withholding its release. (Republic Act No. 8760 shall be referred to herein as the year 2000 General Appropriations Act or year 2000 GAA.)

2) A judgment commanding the respondents to cease from implementing the said year 2000 GAA insofar as the P 10 Billion reduction and withholding of the IRA is concerned.

3) A judgment commanding the respondents to automatically release the total IRA due to local governments as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160).

4) A Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the respondents from implementing the year 2000 GAA insofar as the P 10 Billion reduction in the IRA is concerned, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction commanding the respondents to automatically release the total IRA due to local governments as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991, during the pendency of this Petition.

BASIS OF THE PETITION

The Petition invokes the Honorable Court's exercise of its sacred constitutional obligation to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Art. VII, Sec. 1) The Petition is filed as there is no remedy of appeal and neither is there available to petitioners any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, administrative or otherwise, in the ordinary course of law. The Petition seeks the issuance of the writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the basis of the following:

GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA ARE NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY VIOLATE THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY UNLAWFULLY REDUCING BY TEN BILLION PESOS (P10 BILLION) THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS DUE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND WITHHOLDING THE RELEASE OF SUCH AMOUNT BY PLACING THE SAME UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS." THIS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE IN ART. X, SEC. 6, THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS' JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED TO THEM. IT ALSO VIOLATES THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, SPECIFICALLY, SECS. 18, 284, AND 286.

SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA ARE NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY VIOLATE THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY PLACING TEN BILLION PESOS (P10 BILLION) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS DUE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, EFFECTIVELY AND PRACTICALLY, WITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.

SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA ARE NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS" CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE RESPONDENTS.

SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA ARE NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS" CONSTITUTES AN AMENDMENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, WHICH CANNOT BE DONE IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT AND WHICH PURPOSE WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THE TITLE OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA.

THE YEAR 2000 GAA'S REDUCTION AND WITHHOLDING OF THE IRA UNDERMINES THE FOUNDATION OF OUR LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION.

THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE, IN PASSING AND APPROVING, RESPECTIVELY, THE YEAR 2000 GAA, AND THE RESPONDENTS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE SAID YEAR 2000 GAA, INSOFAR AS SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, ARE CONCERNED, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AS THEY TRANSGRESSED THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE'S PROHIBITION ON ANY INVALID REDUCTION AND WITHHOLDING OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' IRA.

THE PARTIES
The Petitioners

1. Petitioner Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. (ACORD) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at the Second Floor, Ever Theater Building, Tomas Claudio Street, Zamboanga City. ACORD is a non-governmental organization with capability-building programs and services on local governance. ACORD is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Romeo C. Bacharo.

2. Petitioner Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. (BMFI), is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at 63-a 12th Street, Zone 2, Bgy. Upper Bulua, Cagayan De Oro City. BMFI is a Mindanao-based non-governmental organization engaged in sustainable integrated area development towards building empowered sustainable communities. It is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Charlito Manlupig.

3. Petitioner BARRIOS, Inc., is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at Lot 9, Block 4, Aquino St., Doña Soledad Subdivision, Labangal, 9500 General Santos City. It is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Mario Aguja.

4. Petitioner Camarines Sur NGO-PO Development Network, Inc. (CADENET) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at CASAFI Compound, Liboton Street, Naga City. CADENET is a network of non-governmental and people's organizations operating in the province of Camarines Sur who decided to come together in 1993 to advance the agenda of people's participation in governance processes in Naga City and the province of Camarines Sur. CADENET is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Ms. Marilou Perez-Capucao.

5. Petitioner Center for Participatory Governance (CPAG) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at 59-I Jennifer's Apartment, Gen. Echaves St., Cebu City. CPAG is a Cebu-based resource center for local governance and active citizenship. It seeks to institutionalize the precepts of people empowerment and harness the ideals of genuine people participation towards principled partnership with the government. CPAG is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Alvin M. Dizon.

6. Petitioner Environmental Legal Assistance Center, Inc. (ELAC) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 14 Queens Road, Cebu City 6000. ELAC is a non-governmental organization that seeks to protect and assert environmental rights and equitable access and control of the natural resources of the Philippines. It is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Atty. Andres Canivel.

7. Petitioner Fellowship for Organizing Endeavors (FORGE) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at Door No. 4 Middle Road, Queens Road, Cebu City. FORGE works with the urban poor and believes that through its core program - community organizing - a gender-sensitive and ecologically balanced society where the marginalized sectors are culturally, spiritually, economically, and politically empowered will be achieved. It is represented in this Petition by its Program Officer, Ms. Ma. Estela P. Vasquez.

8. Petitioner Foundation for Local Autonomy and Good Governance, Inc. (FLAGG) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 92-A Masikap Extension, Central District, Diliman, Quezon City. FLAGG seeks to uphold the autonomy of local governments and the accountability of both national and local governments. It is represented in this Petition by its President, Mr. Roberto Pagdanganan.
9. Petitioner Institute of Politics and Governance (IPG) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 44 Maginhawa Street, UP Village, Quezon City. IPG is a non-governmental organization that works to further democratic governance in the Philippines by pushing for the implementation of genuine local autonomy and governance, the strengthening of barangay governance, education for active citizenship, and greater participation of women in governance. IPG is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Ms. Maritona Victa-Labajo.

10. Petitioner KAISAHAN para sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan (KAISAHAN) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 43 Masikap Street, Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. KAISAHAN is a social development organization established in 1990 to assist in the promotion of a sustainable and humane society through the empowerment of marginalized groups in rural areas. It assists these sectors in undertaking their own development priorities and participating in local democratic processes. It is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Tomasito S. Villarin.

11. Petitioner Manggagawang Kababaihang Mithi ay Paglaya (Makalaya) is a non-stock non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 102 Scout De Guia Street, Barangay Sacred Heart, Quezon City. MAKALAYA is an organization of women workers from formal and informal labor that organizes, educates, mobilizes and advocates for gender equality and social justice; to develop their potential as leaders towards freedom and women's empowerment in society. It is represented in this Petition by its Chairperson, Ms. Teresita Borgoños.

12. Petitioner Naga City People's Council (NCPC) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at CASAFI Compound, Liboton Street, Naga City. NCPC started as an organization of the non-governmental/people's organization community in Naga City, which had long been operating and involved in various government programs and activities. With the passage of the Naga City People Empowerment Ordinance in 1995, NCPC gained the recognition and acknowledgment of the local government of Naga City. NCPC is now represented in Naga City's local development council and other local special bodies. As a network of accredited non-governmental and people's organizations, NCPC seeks to lead a common direction for non-governmental and people's organizations in terms of partnership with the local government of Naga City. NCPC is represented in this Petition by its Vice Chairperson for External Affairs, Mr. Rolando V. Salazar.

13. Petitioner NGO-PO Council of Camarines Sur for Community Participation and Empowerment, Inc. (NPCCS) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at CASAFI Compound, Liboton Street, Naga City. NPCCS is an aggrupation of accredited non-governmental and people's organizations operating in the municipalities of the province of Camarines Sur, in particular, and the entire province, in general. To date, it has a membership of 45 non-governmental and people's organizations. NPCCS is represented in this Petition by one of the members of its Board of Trustees, Atty. Nelson Legacion.

14. Petitioner Pailig Development Foundation, Inc. (PDFI) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 13 Bauhina Orchids Street, San Miguel Village, Pala-o, Iligan City. It is a service agency committed to the development of the 44 barangays of Iligan City through democratic people's participation. It is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Mr. Antonio M. Liao.

15. Petitioner Philippine Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment Foundation, Inc. (PEACE Foundation, Inc.) is a non-stock, not-for-profit, non-sectarian and national network of social development organizations and provincial non-governmental organizations committed in the development of community-based resource tenure, duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 262 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. It is a broad based sector network working for the empowerment of stakeholders in their community resources. It is represented in this Petition by the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, Mr. Oscar F. Santos.

16. Petitioner Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA) is a non-stock, non-profit organization engaged in rural development, duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 59 C. Salvador Street, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Established in 1984 as a nationwide network of non-governmental organizations responding to rural poverty and underdevelopment, PhilDHRRA has sixty-five member organizations whose collective spread covers some seventy of the seventy-five provinces in the country. PhilDHRRA is represented in this Petition by its National Coordinator, Mr. Philip Peñaflor.

17. Petitioner Pilipina, Inc. (Ang Kilusan ng Kababaihang Pilipino) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at Room 203 PSSC Building, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Pilipina is a mass-based feminist organization, which affirms the vision of a transformed society in which both women, and men shall possess dignity, autonomy and equality. It works for women's full participation in public governance, with stress on public office and movements for social change. Pilipina is represented in this Petition by its National Coordinator, Ms. Elizabeth U. Yang.

18. Petitioner Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at Ground Floor, Hoffner Building, Social Development Complex, Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. SALIGAN is a legal resource non-governmental organization, an alternative law group composed mostly of lawyers, doing developmental legal work with farmers, workers, the urban poor, women, and local communities. SALIGAN has a local governance program that focuses on the democratization of local governance and the effective participation of the people in local governance. SALIGAN is represented in this Petition by its Executive Director, Atty. Raissa H. Jajurie.

19. Petitioner Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULR-TF) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with address at No. 8, Alley 8, Project 6, Quezon City. ULR-TF is a national coalition of urban poor organizations. It seeks to develop concrete resolutions of selected urgent issues in the urban poor communities. It also works for urban poor representation in all levels of governance. ULR-TF is represented in this Petition by its President, Mr. Fidel Rancio.

20. 20. Petitioner ADELINO C. LAVADOR is a Filipino, of legal age and with business address at No. 8, Alley 8, Project 6, Quezon City. She is a member of the Barangay Development Council of Barangay Culiat, Quezon City. Petitioner ISABEL MENDEZ is a Filipino, of legal age and with business address at the Barangay Hall, Barangay Atabay, Alcoy, Cebu. She is the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Atabay, Alcoy, Cebu. She is authorized by a Sanggunian Barangay Resolution to be one of the petitioners in this case. A copy of the resolution is attached to this Petition as Annex E. Petitioner CAROLINA ROMANOS is a Filipino, of legal age and with business address at the Barangay Hall, Barangay Daang Lungsod, Alcoy, Cebu. She is the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Daang Lungsod, Alcoy, Cebu. She is authorized by a Sanggunian Barangay Resolution to be one of the petitioners in this case. A copy of the resolution is attached to this Petition as Annex F.

21. The petitioners are taxpayers and Filipino citizens or non-stock, non-profit corporations composed of Filipino citizens. The petitioners can be served summons and other processes through the undersigned counsel at the address stated below.

22. 22. The petitioners are bringing this case as real parties in interest and as a class suit in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, for themselves and in behalf of all taxpayers and citizens similarly situated. The petitioners are filing this Petition for themselves and others who are similarly situated but are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Honorable Court.

The Respondents

23. Public respondents Ronaldo Zamora, Benjamin Diokno, and Leonor Magtolis-Briones are the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, respectively. The said respondents are all public officers and are being sued in their official capacity. Public respondent Commission on Audit (COA) is a public agency. Respondent Zamora may be served summons and other processes at his office at Malacañang Palace, Manila; respondent Diokno at his office also at Malacañang Palace, Manila; respondent Magtolis-Briones at her office at the Bureau of Treasury, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila; and respondent COA at its office at Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

24. Public respondents are primarily charged with the duty of implementing the year 2000 General Appropriations Act.

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

25. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners hereby certify, as shown by the attached affidavits, that, they have not commenced any action involving the same issues before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or before any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of their knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. The petitioners also certify that should they hereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, they undertake to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof, within five (5) days therefrom.

26. The petitioners further certify that upon the filing of this Petition, they have paid the required docket fees. Proof of service of copies of this Petition on the respondents and on the Solicitor General is submitted together with this Petition.

TIMELINESS AND URGENCY OF THE PETITION

27. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada approved, on 16 February 2000, the year 2000 GAA, vetoing certain items, as well as special and general provisions (not including the provisions herein assailed as unconstitutional). As a result of such approval, the respondents have started the implementation of, and continue to implement, the year 2000 GAA with the unconstitutional provisions assailed in this Petition. The respondents continuously commit acts constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in violation of the rights of the petitioners and other taxpayers and citizens.

28. With the Congress' recent opening for its third and final regular session, among its first tasks will be the deliberations for the budget for the year 2001. The immediate resolution of the issues raised in this Petition will prevent the Congress and the Executive from repeating in next year's GAA, the same transgression of the Constitution and the Local Government Code that they blatantly committed in the year 2000 GAA.

THE MATERIAL FACTS

29. F or Fiscal Year 2000, local governments were supposed to get P121.778 Billion as their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). Attached to this Petition as Annex A is a certified copy of Section 1, XXXVII (A) of the proposed national budget for year 2000. The proposed budget shows the amount of P121.778 Billion appropriated for the IRA.

30. House Bill No. 8374, the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2000, was passed by the House of Representatives without any reduction in the P121.788 Billion proposed by the Executive. At the Senate, however, the Finance Committee proposed a P30 Billion cut on the IRA. Attached to this Petition as Annex B is a certified copy of the records of the deliberations of the Senate on House Bill No. 8374, on 6 December 1999. In his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 8374, Senator John H. Osmeña, Chairperson of the Senate's Committee on Finance, stated:

In the light of our revenue limitations, we have in general instituted cuts as follows:

In travel - 50% in the repairs and maintenance of government facilities - 100% in confidential expenses - 50% across the board; other services - 25%; non-infra capital outlay -25%; training and seminars - 100%.

As a matter of courtesy, we have not cut the budget of the Office of the President proper, the Office of the Vice President, the House of Representatives, and the Judiciary.

As a matter of policy, we have not cut the budget of SUCs' except that of the University of the Philippines and the Debt Service.

We have created on a contingent basis the Internal Revenue Allotment for the local governments. One, we have cut that to P30 billion, and two, we have provided for travel and confidential expenses on a contingent basis of P19.6 billion. (Senate records of deliberations, 6 December 1999, p. 23 [24]; emphasis added.)

31. Expectedly, local officials raised a howl over the proposal. In an unprecedented act, these officials, through the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP, the confederation of the different leagues of local governments), took to the streets and marched in protest against the proposed move. They likewise threatened a four-day work stoppage unless the P30B was restored as a regular appropriation. Soon thereafter, notwithstanding the local officials' complaints and protests, House Bill No. 8374 was passed by both houses of the Congress with P10 Billion of the IRA placed under "unprogrammed funds."

32. On 16 February 2000, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada approved House Bill No. 8374. The President vetoed some items, as well as special and general provisions of the bill. Unfortunately, the P10 Billion cut imposed by the legislature was preserved. House Bill No. 8374, thus, became a law -- Republic Act No. 8760, entitled, "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

33. Section 1, XXXVII (A) of Republic Act No. 8760, the year 2000 GAA, reads:

XXXVII. ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
A. INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT

For apportionment of the shares of local government units in the internal revenue taxes in accordance with the purpose indicated hereunder………………………………………………..P111,778,000,000

x x x x x x x x x

The special provisions of Section 1, LIV, on the other hand, provides:

LIV. UNPROGRAMMED FUND

x x x x x x x x x
Special Provisions

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or when the corresponding funding or receipts for the purpose have been realized except in the special cases covered by specific procedures in Special Provision Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 herein: PROVIDED, That in cases of foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement shall be sufficient compliance for the issuance of a Special Allotment Release Order covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That no amount of the Unprogrammed Fund shall be funded out of the savings generated from programmed items in this Act.

x x x x x x x x x

4. Additional Operational Requirements and Projects of Agencies. The appropriations for Purpose 6 - Additional Operational Requirements and Projects of Agencies herein indicated shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution can be realized based on a quarterly assessment of the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and shall be used to fund the following:
x x x x x x x x x

Internal Revenue Allotments

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses P10,000,000,000
--------------------
Total, IRA P10,000,000,000
--------------------

A certified copy of the quoted portion of the year 2000 GAA (pp. 1114-1115 and 1166-1174) is attached to this Petition as Annex C.

34. While P2.5 Billion, supposedly part of the P10 Billion IRA placed under "unprogrammed funds," were released to the local governments belatedly in March for the first quarter; to date, no such release had been made for the second and third quarters of the year, in clear violation of the Constitution and the Local Government Code, as will be shown in the discussion below.
ISSUE

THE MAIN ISSUE IN THIS PETITION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT, SPECIALLY THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN, COMMITTED (AND IN THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS, ARE STILL COMMITTING) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PASSING, APPROVING, AND IMPLEMENTING, RESPECTIVELY, THE YEAR 2000 GAA INSOFAR AS THE WITHHOLDING OF THE P10 B IRA IS CONCERNED.
The resolution of this principal issue depends, in turn, on the resolution of the constitutional issues raised at the outset of this petition, to wit:

1) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY VIOLATE THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY PLACING TEN BILLION PESOS (P10 BILLION) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS DUE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS" THEREBY VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE IN ART. X, SEC. 6, THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS' JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED TO THEM?

2) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY ENACROACHED ON THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY PLACING TEN BILLION PESOS (P10 BILLION) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENTS DUE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES?

3) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS" CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE RESPONDENTS?

4) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE PLACING OF P10 BILLION PESOS OF THE IRA UNDER "UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS" CONSTITUTES AN AMENDMENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, WHICH CANNOT BE DONE IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT AND WHICH PURPOSE WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THE TITLE OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA?

5) ARE SECTION 1, XXXVII (A) AND LIV, SPECIAL PROVISIONS 1 AND 4, OF THE YEAR 2000 GAA NULL AND VOID FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE REDUCTION AND WITHHOLDING OF THE IRA UNDERMINES THE FOUNDATION OF OUR LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM MANDATED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION?

The petitioners respectfully submit that, in passing and approving, respectively, the year 2000 GAA with the unconstitutional provisions quoted above, the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated the clear provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991, as well as numerous relevant Supreme Court decisions. The respondents' implementation of such void and unconstitutional legislation is a continuing commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and a clear transgression of the Constitution and existing laws. Such unlawful implementation of the unconstitutional law must, perforce, be stopped and the respondents must be directed to strictly comply with the mandates of the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

DISCUSSION

35. Before the discussion of the constitutional issues, it is important to establish the petitioners' legal personality to impugn the validity of the year 2000 GAA on constitutional grounds. In fact, the issue of the petitioners' standing to file this case is as important as, and integral to, the constitutional issues raised. Thus, the Petition shall first deal with this issue.

The petitioners have the legal standing
as they have personal and substantial
interests in this case.

36. The settled rule is that the party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the said party has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 1937) It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which the said party is lawfully entitled or that the said party is in danger of being subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. These requirements, the petitioners humbly submit, are adequately met in this Petition. The petitioners have a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy. The placing of P10 Billion of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds" violates the petitioners' rights to the following:
(1) efficient delivery of basic services;
(2) autonomous local governments that are primarily accountable to the people;
(3) democratic participation in local governance.

The IRA cut adversely affects
the delivery of basic services.

37. Following the constitutional mandate (Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution) for the enactment of a Local Government Code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 2 of the Local Government Code explains the policy of decentralization as a system whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.

38. As a strategy of decentralization, the law adopts the policy of devolution. As defined by the Local Government Code, "devolution" refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (Section 17 [e]) The law mandates the devolution of certain basic services and facilities from the national government to the local government units. The law also authorizes local governments to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated in the Local Government Code. (Section 17 [b]) With the devolution of the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities from the national government to the local government units, local governments became primarily responsible for the delivery of basic services to the people.

39. To enable the local government units to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions, the Local Government Code grants the local government units the necessary resources for these added responsibilities. Declaring this as one of the operative principles of local autonomy and decentralization, the law provides:

Sec. 3 (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in the national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas;

More specifically, the Local Government Code declares that the basic services and facilities the provision of which were devolved to local government units shall be funded from the share of the local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government. (Section 17 [g])

40. As discussed above, the provisions of the Local Government Code clearly show the direct link between the devolved powers and responsibilities (especially with respect to the provision of basic services and facilities), and the local governments' share in the proceeds of national taxes. The grant of the local government units' just share in the proceeds of national taxes is an essential part of devolution, which is, in turn, an essential part of decentralization.

41. The P10 Billion cut in the IRA, the local governments' just share in the proceeds of national taxes, has adversely affected and continues to have a deleterious effect on the local governments' delivery of basic services and facilities to the people. Most local government units (particularly 5th and 6th class municipalities) rely heavily on the IRA for their operations. The reduction in the amount of the IRA received by the local governments ultimately affected and continues to affect the people, among which are the petitioners in this case and the other citizens that they represent. Simply put, fewer funds for local governments means less efficient delivery of basic services to the people.

42. The petitioners, and the other citizens and taxpayers, clearly have the right to the delivery of basic services and facilities by the local governments. With the reduction of the funds available for the discharge of the local governments' primary responsibility to the people, the people will ultimately suffer and be deprived of the basic services that they are entitled to get.

43. As Punong Barangays, petitioners ISABEL MENDEZ (of Barangay Atabay, Alcoy, Cebu) and CAROLINA ROMANOS (of Barangay Daang Lungsod, Alcoy, Cebu) are directly injured by the unconstitutional acts assailed in this Petition. As duly elected local government officials and leaders of their respective communities, the funds available to them for the discharge of their powers, functions, and responsibilities, have been unlawfully reduced by the National Government. As a member of the Barangay Development Council of Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, petitioner ADELINO LAVADOR likewise suffers from the unconstitutional reduction and withholding of the IRA. The Barangay Development Council will now have to contend with the reduced amount of the development funds that are available for the implementation of the Barangay Development Council's plans and programs.

The IRA cut violates the people's
right to have local governments
that enjoy autonomy.

44. More serious than its deleterious effect on the system of decentralization and devolution, and the delivery of basic services to the people, however, the unlawful IRA reduction and withholding shakes the foundations of local autonomy, which is at the heart of our local governance system.

45. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution (the Declaration of Principles) clearly provides that, "The state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." A similar statement is contained in Section 2, Article X, "The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." For its part, the Local Government Code provides that local governments shall enjoy "genuine and meaningful local autonomy" to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. (Section 2.)

46. While autonomy of local governments does not mean absolute independence from the central or national government, it is incompatible with the concept of subservient dependence. In fact, the Code calls the local governments "partners" in national development. Simply put, local governments should have enough elbow room to effectively discharge their powers and responsibilities free from the dictates and control of the national government authorities, subject only to the prescribed limitations of their powers and their accountability to their constituents.

47. It is in this regard that the IRA problem strikes at the very heart of autonomy, and consequently, of effective local governance. The IRA reduction puts local governments at the mercy of the national government authorities in the Executive and Legislative branches. At the constant threat of losing a big chunk of their budget, local governments are susceptible to succumb to the whims and caprices of national government officials, at the expense of the people. Local government officials will be tempted to offer something to national government officials in exchange for the IRA. If not corrected, the bad precedent that was started on this year's budget will perpetuate a system of dependence where local governments always look up to the national government for help. This is clearly anathema to the "self-reliant communities" envisioned in the law.

48. Worse, this culture of dependence has an even uglier side. Local governments' dependence on the national government will inevitably lead to their subservience. They will no longer be free to chart their own destiny and shape their own future. They will forever be towed, and willingly, by the national government. The IRA cut cultivates a system where local government officials who are held hostage by the budget process will be primarily accountable, not to the sovereign people that gave them the power of governance, but to the national leaders that control the nation's purse.

The IRA cut violates the people's
right to democratic participation
in local governance.

49. When the Constitution mandates the setting up of a responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization, the Constitution goes farther and provides that such local governance structure shall have effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. (Art. X, Sec. 3) The Constitution also provides that the legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law. (Art. X, Sec. 9) The Constitution's chapter on Social Justice and Human Rights devotes a portion on the role and rights of people's organizations and guarantees the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making. (Art. XIII, Sec. 15-16) Consistent with the Constitutional policy of democratizing local governance, the Local Government Code provides for the mechanisms that will ensure the people's participation in local governance.

50. These Constitutional and statutory provisions emphasize that the democratic mechanisms that will ensure the people's participation in governance shall remain inseparable from local autonomy and governance. Local autonomy, in fact, is meant to shield local governments from unwarranted influence and control of national government authorities so that these local governments can effectively discharge their powers and responsibilities with only the people's interest in mind.

51. The IRA is meant not only for the cost of devolution but also for the cost of democratization of governance at the local level. Hence, the IRA reduction will certainly mean a reduction in the funds that can finance the mechanisms for people's participation in local governance. It provides local government officials an excuse to dispense with the implementation of the democratic mechanisms and venues for people's participation in governance. The failure to convene the local special bodies, for example, can be blamed on the lack of funds. Doubtless, the IRA cut can also be a ready argument against the implementation of the constitutional mandate for sectoral representation in the local legislative bodies.

52. More than the breakdown in the democratic structures for people's participation in local governance, however, the IRA problem poses a more dangerous, albeit not readily apparent, threat. Using the IRA as an effective carrot - a magic charm - the national government has successfully turned the local governments' loyalty and attention away from their constituents. Local governments are, once more, in danger of being mere instruments of the national government, to the prejudice of the people to whom they should be accountable. Adding insult to injury, all these are made through the use of the people's funds that should have been automatically released to them through the local governments.

53. All these discussion lead to only one conclusion - the IRA reduction and withholding made in the year 2000 GAA directly affects the petitioners and the other citizens that they represent. As shown above, the people have certainly sustained and will continue to sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The petitioners and those they represent have been, and will be, denied their rights and privileges to which they are lawfully entitled. The petitioners are, therefore, proper and real parties in interest in this case.

54. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the petitioners herein have not sufficiently shown any direct injury that gives them the legal personality to file this case, the petitioners humbly submit that, as taxpayers, they have the legal personality to question the validity of the year 2000 GAA.

The petitioners have the legal
standing as taxpayers.

55. In a long line of cases, this Honorable Court allowed taxpayers' suits in cases where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds. As early as the case of Pascual v. Secretary, 110 Phil. 331 (1960), this Honorable Court declared:

Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitute a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a tax-payer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also, taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (110 Phil. 331, 342-343)

56. The year 2000 GAA is a perfect example of an act directly involving the disbursement of public funds. In fact, by its very nature, a general appropriations act governs the disbursement of public funds. It determines and prescribes the amount of public funds that will be used by the government for different expenditures. By directly violating the Constitution and the Local Government Code as regards the IRA that should be released to the local governments, the year 2000 GAA constitutes a "misapplication" and an "illegal disbursement" of public funds. The illegal withholding (and the consequent non-disbursement) of P10 Billion of local government funds is as much an illegal disbursement of public funds as an unauthorized appropriation and use of public funds for unauthorized causes. By refusing to comply with the clear mandate of the Constitution and the Local Government Code for the automatic release of the IRA in the amount provided, the Congress committed an unconstitutional exercise of its spending powers. As taxpayers, the petitioners have the right to question this unconstitutional disbursement of public funds.

57. Furthermore, the petitioners respectfully ask this Honorable Court to rule on the substantial constitutional issues raised because of their "transcendental importance" and their "value as precedents." As early as the Emergency Power Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 93 Phil. 603), this Honorable Court has allowed taxpayers' suits where serious constitutional issues are involved since, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside…technicalities of procedure." The same policy has been applied by this Honorable Court in a long line of cases involving taxpayers' suits, including those filed by people's and non-governmental organizations, among which are: Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989); Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 (1992); KILOSBAYAN v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994); and recently, Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).

58. In the discussion above and in the succeeding discussion, the petitioners have sufficiently shown that the constitutional questions raised in the petition are of transcendental significance to the people. The issues raised in this case involve the very foundations of our system of government. This petition shows a clear case of disregard of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. More than the P10 Billion funds, the principles behind the IRA and behind the country's system of local governance, which the year 2000 GAA blatantly disregarded, are of paramount national interest and importance.

59. Lastly, the people waited for their elected representatives - the local government officials, through the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines - to initiate an action that will question the unconstitutional reduction and withholding of the IRA. To this date, however, to the petitioners' knowledge, no such case has been filed. The petitioners, therefore, invoke their sovereign power as the source of governmental authority, and file this case to correct the illegal act concerning the IRA. It would be myopic and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution to assume that only elected officials may have the standing to bring this case to the attention of this Honorable Court.

60. In view of the discussion above, the petitioners invoke the words of Chief Justice Warren in Flast v. Cohen, 391 US 83 (1968), and humbly ask this Honorable Court -- assuming it finds a barrier to this petition - not to breach the barrier but simply to lower it.

61. The petition shall now go to the substantial constitutional issues.

The year 2000 GAA is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional autonomy of local governments. By placing P10 Billion of the local governments' IRA under "unprogrammed funds," the year 2000 GAA transgressed the constitutional mandate that the local government units' just share in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them.

The IRA is a right.

62. It is necessary to first settle the characterization of the IRA. It is noteworthy that the national government authorities usually refer to the IRA as "assistance" to local government units. Therein lies the rub. The term "assistance" lends itself to an interpretation that the fund may be withdrawn at the pleasure or caprice of both the executive and legislative branches. In a sense, the IRA is deprived of its mandatory nature if and when it is considered as assistance. Against this notion, however, can be found explicit provisions in both the Constitution and the Local Government Code clearly characterizing the IRA as mandatory.

63. On this matter, the Constitution provides:
ART. X. Sec. 6. Local Governments shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (emphasis supplied).

Assuming the Constitutional provision quoted above is not a self-executing principle, the Local Government Code gives this Constitutional provision the necessary executory effect when it provides:

Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. - Local government units shall have the power and authority x x x to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of any further action x x x x

and

Sec. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%):
x x x

and

Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be on a quarterly basis within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local government units under existing laws. (Emphasis Supplied).

64. The unifying theme behind all the provisions cited is the emancipation of the IRA from any form of interference and/or control from the national government. This merely echoes the very underpinnings of the Local Government Code in the first place. Clearly, the IRA is not assistance nor is it subject to any form of control, save only in exceptional circumstances. It is a constitutional and legal mandate and an imperative for effective governance at the local level.

65. This Honorable Court had an opportunity to explain the IRA's rightful characterization. In the recent case of Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (1996), the Supreme Court had the following to say:

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. (252 SCRA 695, 700-701)

In the quoted decision, this Honorable Court has spelled out several "rights" pertaining to local government units. One such right is the IRA.

66. The discussion above makes the following points plainly evident: first, the IRA is not assistance; second, the IRA is a right of local government units; and third, the IRA should be automatically released to local government units. The IRA is not an amount that can be reduced or withheld through ordinary means and under slight pretenses. Any attempt, therefore, to subject the IRA to any condition should prompt one to declare that there has been a violation of the law. The Constitution and the Statute are rather clear when they state that the IRA should be automatically released and should be free from any lien or holdback.

Placing P10 B of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds"
is an unlawful reduction of the IRA.

67. The Local Government Code states that:

Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local Government Units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
x x x

Provided, that in the event of an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the Presidents of the liga to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty per cent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year.

x x x

In addition, Art. 379 of the implementing rules and regulations of the Local Government Code states that:

(a) In the event that an unmanageable public sector deficit is incurred by the national government, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, and the Secretary of Budget and Management shall submit to the President a joint recommendation that will institute necessary adjustments in the IRAs of LGUs.
(b) Upon receipt of the joint recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, and the Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the Presidents of the Leagues of LGUs, the President shall authorize the necessary adjustments of the total IRA to be distributed among the LGUs for the given year, provided, That in no case shall the adjusted amount be less than thirty percent (30%) of the national internal revenue collections of the third fiscal year preceding the fiscal year during which the reduction is to be made.
Adjustments to the IRA share of LGUs shall be made only after effecting a corresponding reduction of the national government expenditures including cash and non-cash budgetary aids to GOCCs, government financial institutions (GFIs), the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), and the Central Bank.

68. Based on the law and the implementing rules, several conditions have to be met before the IRA can be reduced. First, there must be an unmanageable public sector deficit. Second, cuts on the IRA should emanate from the Executive Branch. Third, before such a recommendation can be made, consultation with particular agencies, Congress and the Leagues has to be undertaken. Fourth, the cut cannot reduce the IRA to less than thirty percent (30%) of the amount collected as internal revenue taxes for the third fiscal year preceding the year in which the reduction is sought to be made. Finally, corresponding cuts on other agencies have to be undertaken.

69. The very first condition that must exist is the presence of an unmanageable public sector deficit. In fairness to the Senate Finance Committee, its proposal to cut the IRA was premised on a desire to keep the government's deficit to a reasonable level. Assuming, without conceding, that an unmanageable public sector deficit may be incurred by the government, the test of the infirmity of the cut still has to be weighed by other prerequisites and it is in this regard that the cut imposed falls short of the standard set by the law.

70. First, the law is explicit in stating that any cut should emanate from the executive department. Specifically, it outlines a process whereby the cut should first be recommended by no less than three Cabinet Secretaries. In the present situation, no such recommendation was ever made and the cuts were in fact brought about by Congressional action. Second, it is clear that no consultation with the Leagues concerned was ever undertaken. Elementary fairness should at least have been observed when depriving local government units of the right to the IRA.

71. Defenders of the cut, however, state that in view of the imminent deficit, the cut in the IRA comprises local government units' efforts at "burden sharing" or doing their part, so to speak, in governmental belt tightening. First, it is clear that the cut, even under a scenario that an unmanageable public sector deficit will be incurred, does not comply with the strict provisions of the law. The law has recognized situations where a cut is allowed but has provided for the manner in which the same should be made. Any deviation from the manner so provided is therefore illegal. Second, it should be noted that the "burden" has not been shared equally. An examination of the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 8374 would reveal that some agencies' and offices' appropriations were actually increased from what was initially earmarked in House Bill 8374. Curiously, among the items where cuts were imposed, it was the IRA that received the biggest slash. A certified copy of the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 8374 is attached to this Petition as Annex D.

72. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that no real cut was imposed on the IRA, placing P10 B of the total IRA due the local governments under "unprogrammed funds," in itself, constitutes an unlawful withholding that constitutes a gross violation of the constitutional mandate for the automatic release of the IRA and the Local Government Code's provisions on such automatic release.

Placing P10 B of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds"
is an illegal withholding of the IRA.

73. Section 1, LIV, Special Provision No. 4, of the year 2000 GAA provides that the appropriations indicated therein, which includes the P10 B IRA, "shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution can be realized based on a quarterly assessment of the Development Budget Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives." This is clearly a prohibited withholding of the IRA. The release of the IRA is made subject to a condition contrary to the constitutional mandate for its automatic release and to the Local Government Code's prohibition against any lien or holdback. The fact that the release of the P10B IRA is subject to a condition - it shall be released only when the original revenue targets can be realized - runs counter to the absolute language employed in the Constitution and the law, that the IRA should be released automatically. It is, to employ the language of the law itself, made subject to a "holdback".

74. The recent decision of this Honorable Court in the case of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Petitioner; Roberto Pagdanganan, Intervenor, v. Hon. Alexander Aguirre and Hon. Emilia Boncodin, Respondents, G.R. No. 132988, 19 July 2000, applies squarely to the present case. The Honorable Court ruled:

Withholding a Part
of LGUs' IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning, The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. (pp. 20-22.)

Applying the Honorable Court's quoted decision to the present case, the withholding of the P10 B IRA, albeit temporary, clearly contravenes the Constitution and the Law. Although temporary, it constitutes a holdback that is prohibited by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

The Local Government Code's determination of the constitutionally
mandated just share of local governments in national taxes
constitutes a continuing appropriation.

75. The respondents may argue that Congress' power of the purse necessarily includes the power to allocate the amount it deems necessary for the local governments. This argument, however, is bereft of any basis. The Constitution mandates that local governments shall have a just share in the national taxes. The Constitution also provides that such just share shall be "as determined by law." Compliance with the Constitutional mandate and the statutory determination of the just share of local governments in the national taxes came with the passage of the Local Government Code. Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides the formula for the computation of the IRA, and the basis for such computation (i.e., the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year). Section 285 provides the formula for the allocation of the IRA among the different local government units. Section 286 provides for the automatic release of the IRA, without need of any further action, and the manner of such automatic release (i.e., on a quarterly basis, within five [5] days after the end of each quarter). Section 286 further provides that the IRA shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the National Government for whatever purpose.

76. The Local Government Code clearly supplies the constitutionally mandated determination of the just share of local governments in the national taxes. Such determination, the petitioners submit, is a valid appropriation made by law. In the case of Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), a case involving the automatic appropriation for debt servicing, the Honorable Court quoted with approval the Solicitor General's discussion of the Governmental budgetary process. The discussion regarding the manner of appropriation is worth quoting:

More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly ( as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed, whether in the past or in the present. (196 SCRA 221, 237)

77. Following the explanation in Guingona v. Carague, the Local Government Code's provisions on the formula for the IRA and the manner for its release constitutes a valid appropriation which is not only for one year but for as long as the Local Government Code's provisions subsist and have not been properly modified. (The petitioners will explain below that there has been no valid amendment of the Local Government Code.) In fact, the appropriation for the IRA is in a more favorable position compared to the appropriation for debt servicing. Unlike the debt servicing appropriation, the IRA has a definite formula, which was fixed by law, and a definite base figure for the computation.

The year 2000 GAA is null and void for being unconstitutional as it violates the autonomy of local governments by placing P10 Billion of the IRA within the control of the central government authorities.

78. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution (the Declaration of Principles) clearly provides that, "The state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." Section 2, Article X (Local Government, General Provisions), in turn, provides that, "The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." For its part, the Local Government Code declares that local governments shall enjoy "genuine and meaningful local autonomy" to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. (Sec. 2)

79. Faithful to the mandate of the Constitution, the Local Government Code contains provisions that are meant to respect and preserve the autonomy of local governments. Thus, it provides that the President shall exercise "general supervision" only, not control, over local government units. (Sec. 25 [b]) This general supervision is meant to ensure that the acts of local government units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. It does not authorize the President to unduly meddle in local affairs. National agencies and offices, on the other hand, are tasked to coordinate with the concerned local government units in the discharge of their project implementation functions. (Sec. 25 [c]) Moreover, these agencies and offices are mandated to ensure the participation of local government units both in the planning and implementation of national projects. In fact, the Local Government Code even goes to the extent of declaring that no project or program shall be implemented by government authorities without prior consultations with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other concerned sectors, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned. (Sec. 26-27)

80. All these provisions in the Local Government Code are meant to ensure the autonomy of local governments, following the express mandate of the Constitution. Local autonomy, as stated in the law, is envisioned to enable local governments to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. This principle of autonomy is premised on the recognition that local problems and concerns are best understood and resolved by the local governments and that local government units can effectively address these problems and concerns if they are equipped for the purpose as self-reliant communities, with minimum interference from national government officials.

81. The underlying reason for the preferential treatment of the IRA is, as stated earlier, the policy of emancipating the IRA from any form of interference and/or control from the national government. Fiscal autonomy of local governments is indispensable to their political autonomy. The special treatment of the IRA is rooted in the principle of local autonomy that guarantees the right of local governments to chart their own destiny and shape their own future with only limited intervention from the national government.

82. With the recent conflict on the IRA, a number of dangers that threaten the Philippine system of local governance surfaced. On the part of the national government officials, the debate on the IRA highlights the mistaken belief that local governments are at the mercy of the central government, and that the IRA is a form of assistance given out of the generosity of the national government. On the part of the local government officials, the IRA debate shows their vulnerability to succumb to pressure and influence from the national leadership.

83. With the IRA cut, local government officials now have to court the national authorities, even beg, for the release of the IRA which is unlawfully withheld. This undermines the integrity of our local governance system and destroys the foundations of autonomy and democracy in local governance. It makes local governments extremely dependent, and therefore, subservient, to the national government. This is clearly contrary to the constitutional autonomy of local governments.

The year 2000 GAA is null and void for being unconstitutional as the placing of P10 Billion of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds" constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the respondents.

84. In placing P10 Billion of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds," the Congress made its release subject to the realization of the revenue targets, based on quarterly assessments. In doing this, the legislature left in the hands of the Executive the determination of whether or not to release the P10 Billion funds, and if it decides to release it, when such release will be done. This certainly constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers.

85. A law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be left nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that must be filled before it can be enforced, the delegate will then have the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion which is legislative in order to repair the omission. This constitutes invalid delegation. (Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 234 [1991]) In this case, the year 2000 GAA leaves the Executive with the opportunity to step into the shoes of the Legislative and to exercise powers that are clearly legislative in nature. The year 2000 GAA does not contain reasonable parameters that will guide the Executive in the enforcement of its provision as regards the P10 Billion IRA. What situation will justify the release of the P10 Billion IRA? Should the whole amount be released within the year or should the Executive release only part of the P10 Billion? Or should the P10 Billion be withheld in its totality? When and in what manner should the release, if any, be done? All these questions are left unanswered. The Executive has unlimited discretion to fill these gaps. Doubtless, this is invalid delegation of legislative powers.

86. By its very nature, an appropriations act specifies the use of public funds. In the case of the P10 B IRA, the Legislature abdicated its constitutionally mandated function by granting the Executive unbridled discretion to make appropriations.

The year 2000 GAA is null and void for being unconstitutional as the placing of P10 Billion of the IRA under "unprogrammed funds" constitutes an amendment of the Local Government Code of 1991, which cannot be done in a general appropriations act and which purpose was not reflected in the title of the year 2000 GAA.

87. Article VI, Section 25 of the Constitution provides, in part, that, "No provision or enactment shall be embraced in a general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein." This Honorable Court explained this provision in the case of Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), thus:

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. x x x x (235 SCRA 506, 534; Underscoring supplied.)

88. By withholding and placing under "unprogrammed funds" P10 Billion of the total P121.788 IRA that should be released based on the formula prescribed by the Local Government Code, the year 2000 GAA, in effect, amends the substantial provisions of the Local Government Code. It modifies not only the formula for the computation of the amount of the IRA (i.e. 40% or in a reduced amount not lower than 30% of the taxes collected in the third year preceding the current year [Sec. 284]), but also the manner of the automatic release of the IRA (i.e., within five [5] days after the end of each quarter, the IRA being free from any lien or holdback for whatever purpose [Sec. 286]) . As stated in the quoted decision, this should be done in a separate enactment and cannot be done in the general appropriations act.

89. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that such amendment of the Local Government Code can be done in the year 2000 GAA, the said provision amending the Local Government Code is still null and void. Such amendment, if it was really the intention of the legislature, is not reflected in the title of the year 2000 GAA. This is again a violation of the Constitution, specifically, Article VI, Section 26, which provides that, "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The amendment of the Local Government Code is neither the only subject embraced in the year 2000 GAA (as the said law's main subject is to appropriate funds for the operation of the government for the year 2000) nor is it reflected in the title. As such, the provision that amends the Local Government Code is unconstitutional and therefore, void.

90. In the case of Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez (15 SCRA 479 [1965]), the Supreme Court explained the reason behind the rule on the title and the effect of non-compliance with the rule:

Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
x x x x x x x x x
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional provision. (15 SCRA 479, 495-496; Emphasis added.)

The ruling in the quoted decision squarely applies to this case. The year 2000 GAA, insofar as it sought to amend the Local Government Code, must be declared void for not conforming to the constitutional requirement.

The Congress and the Executive, in passing and approving, respectively, the year 2000 GAA, and the respondents, in implementing the said year 2000 GAA, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as they transgressed the Constitution and the Local Government Code with respect to the reduction and withholding of the local governments' IRA.

91. As shown by the discussion above, the Congress, the Executive, and the respondents, in particular, clearly committed a blatant transgression of the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and decisions of this Honorable Court with respect to the reduction and withholding of the IRA of local governments. Their acts constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

92. The issue in this case is not the wisdom of the policy formulation and determination of the Legislative and the Executive. What is principally involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of the year 2000 GAA. This case concerns the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed not just in legislation but in the Constitution itself. Even assuming that the issue presented is political in nature, this Honorable Court is still not precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution, and considering that this case really necessitates the resolution of serious constitutional issues that are of public interest and national significance.

The year 2000 GAA's reduction and withholding of the IRA undermines the foundation of our local governance system which is essential to the efficient operation of the government, in general, and the development of the nation.

93. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the IRA is a right of local governments and the people. Local governments are given the IRA, their share in the national taxes, because they share the burden of serving the public. With the enactment of the Local Government Code, local governments are lodged with more powers and responsibilities. It is only equitable that local governments share in the resources that are available for governance because they share the burden of governance. Contrary to the apparent misconception of some national government officials, the IRA is not "assistance" from the national government. It is that part of the public funds that the people, through the Constitution and the law, specifically allocated to finance the effective discharge of the powers and responsibilities that are assigned to the local governments.

94. It is clear that the right to the IRA has been violated. The automatic release of the IRA and the strict requirements for its allowable reduction are not merely arbitrary impositions made by the framers of the Constitution and the legislators. The special treatment of the IRA is rooted in three essential principles of local governance: decentralization, local autonomy and democracy. Any effort to undermine the preferred position of the IRA, therefore, adversely affects the very stability of the country's system of local governance.

95. As adequately explained above, decentralization and devolution of functions and responsibilities necessarily entail the decentralization of government resources. Decentralization and devolution must be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources for the local governments to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions. Hence, local governments are given the right to a just share in the national taxes - the IRA. The grant of reasonably adequate resources to local governments and the preferential treatment for these resources are necessary to ensure the autonomy of local governments. Thus, the Constitution and the Local Government Code mandates for the automatic release of the IRA in order to shield it from any form of interference and control from the national government.

96. Local autonomy, in turn, is indispensable in democratizing local governance. Local governments' freedom from the control of central government authorities is essential to the local governments' accountability to the people and their efficient operations as partners in national development.

97. More than the actual reduction in the amount of the IRA, this issue should be the nation's primary concern. The unconstitutional reduction and withholding of the IRA undermines the very principles upon which our system of local governance is founded. Since the local governments are integral to our system of government, the emasculation of the government structures at the local level may ultimately weaken the entire governmental system. Ultimately, it is not simply about money, it is about governance.

Final Word

98. Assuming that the P10 Billion IRA placed under "unprogrammed funds" are released by the national government pending the resolution of this case, the constitutional issues raised in this Petition still require a definitive ruling from this Honorable Court. The release of the P10 Billion IRA will not make this case moot and academic as it is the manner of the appropriation and the manner of release that are put in issue.

99. Even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that this case can be considered moot and academic, the utmost significance of the issues raised in the Petition must be resolved lest the transgression that had been committed be repeated. The petitioners invoke the Honorable Court's ruling in the case of Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 19 (1986). This Honorable Court should not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

100. The petitioners, for themselves and for others that they represent, respectfully ask the Honorable Court to grant the Petition.

GROUNDS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION

As explained above, the respondents are continuously committing blatant violations of the Constitution and the Local Government Code to the extreme prejudice of the petitioners and those that they represent. Pending action by this Honorable Court on the Petition, the petitioners are entitled to have the respondents and all persons acting for or in their behalf enjoined from continuing with the implementation of the unconstitutional provisions of the year 2000 GAA. The petitioners are likewise entitled to a Preliminary Writ of Mandatory Injunction to compel the respondents to automatically release the IRA as mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code, without any condition or holdback.

Unless the implementation of the unconstitutional provisions of the year 2000 GAA is enjoined and unless the respondents are ordered to automatically release the IRA pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the petitioners and the persons they represent stand to suffer irreparable injury that cannot be accurately estimated. The continuing misapplication of public funds and destruction of the foundations of our local governance system must be immediately stopped.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, the petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court issue a decision:

1) declaring null and void, for being unconstitutional, Section 1, XXXVII (A) and LIV, Special Provisions 1 and 4 of Republic Act No. 8760 entitled, "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," insofar as it reduced the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local governments by TEN BILLION PESOS (P10B) by placing such amount under the item, "unprogrammed funds," and withholding the release of such amount.

2) ordering the respondents to cease from implementing the said year 2000 GAA insofar as the P 10 Billion reduction and withholding of the IRA are concerned.

3) ordering the respondents to automatically release the IRA due to local governments in the amount of P121.788 Billion as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

4) pending the resolution of this case, issuing a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the respondents from implementing the year 2000 GAA insofar as the P 10 Billion reduction in the IRA is concerned, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction commanding the respondents to automatically release the IRA due to local governments as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991, during the pendency of this Petition.

The petitioners pray for other just and equitable remedies.

Quezon City for Manila, 8 August 2000.

MARLON J. MANUEL
PTR No. 1172590; 01-25-00; Quezon City
IBP No. 499809; 01-26-00; Bulacan

VINCENT EDWARD R. FESTIN
PTR No. 1172591; 01-25-00; Quezon City
IBP No. 502295; 02-01-00; Quezon City

SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN)
G/F Hoffner Building, Social Development Complex
Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights Quezon City

DANTE B. GATMAYTAN
PTR No. 1124382; 01-12-00; Quezon City
IBP No. 497069; 01-07-00; Quezon City

KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN SA KANAYUNAN AT
REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN)
No. 43 Masikap Street, Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City

MANIFESTATION

Pursuant to Rule 13, section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioners respectfully manifest that respondents were served their respective copies of this Petition by means of registered mail because of the considerable distance between the parties' respective offices and the heavy work load of the counsel's messenger.

MARLON J. MANUEL

COPY FURNISHED:

HON. RONALDO ZAMORA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Malacañang, Manila

HON. BENJAMIN DIOKNO
SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Malacañang, Manila

HON. LEONOR MAGTOLIS-BRIONES
NATIONAL TREASURER
BUREAU OF TREASURY
Palacio del Gobernador
Intramuros, Manila

HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village
Makati City

IRAcer
mjm
apaap

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES

I, Marlon J. Manuel, of legal age, married, with business address at the Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN), G/F Hoffner Building, Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:

1. I am the counsel for the petitioners;
2. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada approved on 16 February 2000 Republic Act No. 8760 entitled, "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," the year 2000 General Appropriations Act.
3. As a result of such approval, the respondents have started the implementation of, and continue to implement, the year 2000 GAA with the unconstitutional provisions assailed in this Petition.
4. The respondents continuously commit acts constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in violation of the rights of the petitioners and other taxpayers and citizens.
5. This Petition is timely filed to question the validity of the said Republic Act 8760 on constitutional grounds.
6. This Petition requires urgent resolution as the Congress will be starting the deliberations for the budget for the year 2001. The immediate resolution of the issues raised in this Petition will prevent the Congress and the Executive from repeating in next year's GAA, the same transgression of the Constitution that they did in the year 2000 GAA.
7. I execute this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing statements

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand, this day of August 2000 at Quezon City.

MARLON J. MANUEL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of August 2000, affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 10401836 issued on 18 February 2000 in Quezon City. .

Book No.____;
Page No._____;
Doc. No.______;
Series of 2000.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, ROMEO REYES, Filipino, of legal age, married, with business address at Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN), G/F Hoffner Building, Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Metro Manila, after being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:
1. I am employed as a messenger at Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN), G/F Hoffner Building, Ateneo de Manila University, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, counsel for petitioner herein;
2. I filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Court of Appeals in the case entitled Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. (ACORD), et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, et al.;
3. I served copies of the Petition to the following by means of registered mail:

HON. RONALDO ZAMORA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Malacañang, Manila

HON. BENJAMIN DIOKNO
SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Malacañang, Manila

HON. LEONOR MAGTOLIS-BRIONES
NATIONAL TREASURER
BUREAU OF TREASURY
Palacio del Gobernador
Intramuros, Manila

HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village
Makati City

4. I execute this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand, this day of August 2000 at Quezon City.

ROMEO REYES

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of August 2000, affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 02545155 issued on 22 January 2000 at Quezon City.

Book No._____;
Page No._____;
Doc. No._____;
Series of 2000.

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